QR codes and address poisoning: the stranger doesn't break your wallet, he edits your shortcuts
A QR code and your transaction history are shortcuts: they spare you from typing an address. Scammers attack the shortcuts, with codes that point to their own wallets and with look-alike addresses planted in your history. The defence is to copy addresses from the receiver's own source and read what you're about to sign.
Grandma Rosa pays her nephew every month. She never types his address. She opens her history, finds the previous payment, copies the address and sends. Quick and safe, she thinks.
One morning there's a new line in her history. It says she sent nothing to an address that starts and ends exactly like her nephew's. She doesn't remember sending it. She's right: she didn't. The stranger at the gate wrote that line for her, so that next month she'd copy his address instead.
That's address poisoning. Its cousin is the fake QR code. Neither one breaks your wallet. They edit the shortcuts you use to avoid reading an address.
What it is
A QR code is just text in a picture. For Bitcoin, BIP 21 defines the text: an address plus optional details such as the amount, written as a link starting with "bitcoin:". Its stated purpose is to let people pay by "scanning QR Codes" (BIP 21). The wallet fills in the address for you. Whoever made the code chose that address.
Address poisoning plants a look-alike address in your transaction history. Researchers at Carnegie Mellon University describe three ways it's done on Ethereum-style chains (Tsuchiya and others):
- A tiny transfer: the attacker sends you a small amount of the token you used, from the look-alike.
- A zero-value transfer: a transfer of nothing appears in your history "from V to L", from you, the victim, to the look-alike.
- A counterfeit token: the same amount you sent, but in a fake token the attacker made.
All three have one goal: that the look-alike sits in your history next to the real one.
How it works: the numbers behind the poison
The Carnegie Mellon team, publishing at USENIX Security 2025, scanned Ethereum and BNB Smart Chain from 1 July 2022 to 30 June 2024 (USENIX). What they counted:
- About 270 million poisoning transfers, aimed at about 17 million victims (full paper).
- 6,633 cases where it worked: a victim later paid the look-alike.
- At least $83.8 million lost. The authors call it a lower bound, because they only tracked the main stablecoins.
- The largest single loss they counted: $20 million.
- One they couldn't count: a victim who "mistakenly sent 1,155 WBTC (≈68M USD) to a lookalike address". The attempt was in their data, the final transfer wasn't, because it was in wrapped bitcoin, not a stablecoin.
The attacks come fast. Poisoning transfers follow a victim's payment "typically within a short period of time", and the researchers looked at the 20 minutes after each payment (full paper). The look-alikes are built to match the start and end; the EU supervisors add that changes are "often in the middle of the address" (EBA, EIOPA and ESMA). About one attempt in 40,000 worked. That's plenty when you send 270 million.
The fake QR code
The QR trick needs no blockchain at all. The FBI warned on 4 November 2021 that scammers "provide a QR code associated with the scammer's cryptocurrency wallet", then send the victim to a crypto ATM to pay into it. Its advice: "Do not follow instructions from someone you have never met to scan a QR code and send payment" (FBI IC3).
Codes in public places get swapped too. The US Federal Trade Commission reported on 6 December 2023 that scammers were "covering up QR codes on parking meters with a QR code of their own" (FTC). The EU supervisors' factsheet says it in four words: "don't scan unknown QR codes".
Why it matters
- Both attacks use your good habits. Not typing addresses avoids typos. It also hands the address to whoever controls the shortcut.
- The loss is final. The EU supervisors warn that crypto funds sent this way are "lost in most of the cases permanently".
- The attack is cheap to repeat. 270 million attempts in two years means the stranger can afford to be wrong almost every time.
Where people get it wrong
- "It's in my history, so I sent it." A zero-value transfer can show up as if from you. History is a record of what happened to your address, not a list of trusted contacts.
- "A transfer of zero can't hurt." The zero isn't the attack. The address next to it is.
- "QR codes are safer than copying." A code is as honest as the person who printed it.
- "Nobody would bother with my small wallet." The researchers counted about 17 million victims.
Copy from the source, never from the history
Take every address from the receiver's own source: their wallet's receive screen, shown to you in person, or a saved contact you checked once properly. Never from your transaction history, and never from a code a stranger sent you. After scanning, read the address the wallet shows, start, middle and end, before you sign. If your wallet lets you hide zero-value and unknown token transfers, switch that on.
The stranger at the gate doesn't pick locks. He just moves the door a little to the left and waits.
Frequently asked questions
What is address poisoning in crypto?
A scam in which the attacker creates an address that looks like one you use, usually matching its first and last characters, and plants it in your transaction history with a tiny, zero-value or fake-token transfer. The hope is that you copy it next time instead of the real one.
How much has been lost to address poisoning?
Researchers at Carnegie Mellon University counted at least $83.8 million lost on Ethereum and BNB Smart Chain between July 2022 and June 2024, from about 270 million attempts. They call it a lower bound, because they only tracked the main stablecoins.
Why did I receive a zero-value transaction from an unknown address?
It is most likely address poisoning. The attacker wants a look-alike address to appear in your history. Don't interact with it, and never copy addresses from your history.
Are crypto QR codes safe?
A QR code only stores text, often an address and an amount. It's as safe as its source. Scan codes the receiver shows you from their own wallet, and check the address your wallet displays before you confirm.
Can I get my crypto back after sending it to a poisoned address?
Usually not. Crypto transfers are generally irreversible, and the EU's financial supervisors warn that such funds are lost in most cases. Report it to the police and to the platform you used, and beware of "recovery services", which are often the next scam.
Sources
- Nils Schneider and Matt Corallo, BIP 21: URI scheme
- Tsuchiya, Dong, Soska and Christin, Blockchain address poisoning (USENIX Security 2025)
- Tsuchiya and others, Blockchain address poisoning (full paper, arXiv 2501.16681)
- FBI, Internet Crime Complaint Center, Fraudulent schemes leveraging cryptocurrency ATMs and QR codes (I-110421-PSA, 4 November 2021)
- US Federal Trade Commission, Scammers hide harmful links in QR codes to steal your information (6 December 2023)
- EBA, EIOPA and ESMA, Crypto frauds and scams: stay alert and protect yourself (factsheet, 15 December 2025)

