Level 2 · First stepsThe village#110

Shamir backups and split seeds: share the secret, don't cut the words

Cutting your seed phrase into pieces makes every piece a head start for a thief and every lost piece a disaster. Shamir backups, standardised in SLIP-0039, split the secret so that any two of three shares can rebuild it and a single share reveals nothing.

Grandma Rosa has a clever idea. She cuts her card of 24 words into three strips of eight. One stays in her kitchen, one goes to Anna, and one goes to a neighbour across the square. No single strip opens anything, she reasons, so nobody can cheat her.

Then the neighbour moves away and the strip goes with him. Rosa's coins are now locked behind eight missing words. Meanwhile Ben, visiting for tea, has quietly copied the strip in her kitchen, and he's already one third of the way to her key.

Cutting the words feels like splitting the risk. It actually multiplies it. The right tool has existed since 1979: split the secret mathematically, so that any two pieces rebuild it and one piece on its own is worth nothing.

What it is

Secret sharing is a way of dividing a secret into shares, with a threshold. In a "2-of-3" setup you make three shares, and any two of them rebuild the secret. The idea comes from the cryptographer Adi Shamir, who described how to split data so that it is "easily reconstructable from any k pieces, but even complete knowledge of k - 1 pieces reveals absolutely no information" about it (Shamir, 1979).

For wallets, the standard is SLIP-0039, written by a team at SatoshiLabs and marked final (SLIP-0039). It turns each share into words, so a "Shamir backup" looks like several word lists instead of one.

How it works: the arithmetic of cutting

A BIP 39 phrase of 24 words carries 256 bits of randomness plus an 8-bit checksum. A 12-word phrase carries 128 bits plus 4. Each word is one of 2,048, so each word is worth 11 bits (BIP 39). Now cut, and count. These are our own calculations from those numbers.

  1. Three strips, all needed (3-of-3). Lose any one strip and you face eight unknown words: 2,048 to the power of 8, about 300 trillion trillion combinations. The checksum rules out 255 in every 256, which still leaves about 1.2 trillion trillion. Your backup has three ways to die instead of one.
  2. Overlapping cards (a home-made 2-of-3). To survive a lost card, people give each holder two thirds: strips A and B, B and C, A and C. Now any holder of one card knows 16 of your 24 words. The secret you protect drops from 256 bits to about 80: from beyond astronomical to merely very large.
  3. The same trick with 12 words. Each card holds 8 of the 12 words. One card leaves four unknown words: 2,048 to the power of 4, about 17.6 trillion, and the checksum cuts that to about 1.1 trillion. That's a big number for a person and a manageable one for a room of rented computers. The full 12 words, by contrast, mean 2 to the power of 128 guesses, which no computer can work through.

Now a real 2-of-3 Shamir backup. One share tells its holder nothing at all, not one bit of the key. Two shares rebuild it exactly. Lose one, and you're fine. Ben can copy a share all night.

What SLIP-0039 adds

The standard handles the practical details that a home-made scheme gets wrong:

  • Its own word list. SLIP-0039 uses a list of exactly 1,024 words, different from BIP 39's.
  • Fixed lengths. A share is 20 words for a 128-bit secret and 33 words for a 256-bit one.
  • Groups. You can set up to 16 groups, each with up to 16 shares, for example "two of the family shares, or one from the lawyer plus one from the safe".
  • No mixing. The authors say it is mainly meant to replace BIP 39 and that "for the most part, the two are not compatible". Converting an existing BIP 39 phrase is possible only at the price of shares that are 59 words long.

That last point matters. You can't take the 24 words you already have and Shamir-split them in a normal wallet. Usually you create a new wallet that uses Shamir from the start, and move your coins into it.

Why it matters

A single backup is a single point of failure, in both directions. One card can be lost, and one card can be found. The 3-copies rule from our Wallets section fights the first danger with more copies, which feeds the second.

Shamir changes the trade-off. Every share can sit with a different person or in a different place, and none of them can be used alone. SLIP-0039's authors name the risk it addresses: with ordinary redundant backups, "there is a substantial risk of the backup holder absconding with the asset."

Where people get it wrong

  • "Half the words is half the security." No. Every known word removes 11 bits, and the last few words are the ones that kept the search impossible.
  • "I'll split my existing phrase with Shamir." In practice, wallets make SLIP-0039 shares from a new secret. Your old words stay as dangerous as before until you move the coins.
  • "Shamir is the same as multisig." Shamir splits one key for storage, and the full key exists again whenever you recover. Multisig uses several separate keys that each sign, and the full set never sits in one place.
  • "Shares are safe to keep together." Two shares in the same drawer are a complete key in the same drawer.
  • "Any wallet can read my shares." Only wallets that support SLIP-0039. Check before you rely on it.

Count your strips

If you've already cut your words into pieces, count how many pieces you would need to rebuild the wallet and how many people hold how many words. If any one person holds more than half, or losing any one piece locks you out, you've built the worst of both worlds.

The fix isn't sharper scissors. It's a new wallet, set up properly with shares or with multisig, and the coins moved across. Cut a cake in thirds and everyone gets something. Share a secret properly and nobody gets anything until enough of them agree.

Frequently asked questions

Is it safe to split my seed phrase into parts?

Not by cutting the words. Every part you hand out reveals part of the key, and a lost part can lock you out. Proper secret sharing, such as SLIP-0039, splits the secret so a single share reveals nothing.

What is a Shamir backup?

A backup made with Shamir's secret sharing, where a wallet's secret is split into several word lists called shares. You choose a threshold, such as two of three, and any shares that meet it can rebuild the wallet. Fewer shares than the threshold reveal no information about the secret.

Is SLIP-0039 compatible with BIP 39 seed phrases?

For the most part, no. SLIP-0039 uses its own 1,024-word list and share format. Its authors say converting a BIP 39 phrase is possible only with shares 59 words long, so most people create a new Shamir wallet instead.

What is the difference between Shamir backups and multisig?

Shamir splits one secret for storage and rebuilds the whole key when you recover. Multisig uses several independent keys, and a set number of them must each sign a transaction, so the full set never needs to be in one place.

How many shares should a Shamir backup have?

A common setup is two of three, which survives one lost share while a single share stays useless. More shares and higher thresholds add safety against theft but add more pieces to keep track of.

Sources

  1. Adi Shamir, How to share a secret, Communications of the ACM 22(11), November 1979
  2. SatoshiLabs, SLIP-0039: Shamir's Secret-Sharing for Mnemonic Codes (Rusnak, Kozlik, Vejpustek, Susanka, Palatinus, Hoenicke)
  3. BIP 39, Mnemonic code for generating deterministic keys

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