"Blockchain is unhackable": the notebook holds, the doors around it don't
A large public blockchain is very hard to rewrite. That's not the same as unhackable. Keys get stolen, smart contracts and bridges have bugs, small chains can be outvoted, and in March 2022 one bridge lost 173,600 ether and 25.5 million USDC because five keys were enough.
Every house in the village keeps a copy of the notebook. To change one old line, Ben would have to change it in most of the houses at once, and outwork all of them. He has tried. He always loses.
So when the travelling merchant opens a ferry across the river, the village relaxes. The ferry's ledger is written in the notebook too. "Unhackable," says the merchant. Then one night someone walks off with the ferry's strongbox. The notebook records the theft perfectly, line by line.
That's the problem with "blockchain is unhackable". The notebook is hard to rewrite. The doors, keys and machines built around it are as hackable as anything else.
What it is
Immutability is the real property: once a record is deep in a large blockchain, changing it would mean redoing an enormous amount of work or controlling most of the network. Our articles on changing the past and on the 51% attack explain why.
"Unhackable" claims far more. It suggests that nothing connected to a blockchain can be stolen, broken or tricked. Bitcoin's white paper never claimed that. It promised a system that is secure "as long as honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any cooperating group of attacker nodes" (Nakamoto, 2008). That's a condition, not a guarantee, and it only covers the record itself.
How it works: the Ronin bridge
A bridge is a service that lets you move tokens from one blockchain to another. In practice it holds the coins on one side and issues matching tokens on the other, which makes it a large strongbox. Here is how one was emptied, in Ronin's own account (Ronin, 2022).
- The design. Ronin, a blockchain built for a game, had 9 validators: computers that approve deposits and withdrawals. "Five out of the nine validator signatures are needed."
- The weak spot. Four of those validators were run by one company, Sky Mavis. A fifth, run by a group called Axie DAO, had once given Sky Mavis permission to sign on its behalf. That permission "was not revoked" when the arrangement ended in December 2021.
- 23 March 2022. An attacker gets control of Sky Mavis's four validators and, through what Ronin calls a backdoor in one of its servers, the Axie DAO one. Five keys. Ronin's summary: "The attacker used hacked private keys in order to forge fake withdrawals."
- The loss. Two transactions drain 173,600 ether and 25.5 million USDC from the bridge.
- 29 March 2022. Six days later, the team finds out, "after a report from a user being unable to withdraw 5k ETH from the bridge."
- The repair. Ronin raises the threshold from five signatures to eight out of nine. In April 2022 Ronin reports that the FBI has attributed the attack to the North Korea based Lazarus Group.
Notice what wasn't hacked. Not one block of Ethereum was rewritten. Every signature was valid. The network did exactly what five keys told it to do.
The four doors
When you hear "a blockchain was hacked", it nearly always means one of these.
- The keys. Steal a private key, or trick its owner into signing, and the network accepts the payment. Our article on whether Bitcoin can be hacked follows two exchange thefts that worked this way.
- The machines on top. Smart contracts and bridges are programs. A bug in a program that holds money is a hole in the strongbox. The DAO in 2016, from our Ethereum history article, was the first big example.
- Small villages. A chain with little mining or staking power can be outvoted. Our 51% attack article covers chains where history was rewritten.
- The software itself. Bitcoin's own code has had serious bugs, found and fixed, as the hacking article explains.
Why it matters
The word "unhackable" is a sales word. It's used to sell tokens, bridges and platforms by borrowing the reputation of the notebook underneath.
Your coins are only as safe as the weakest door between you and them. On a big public chain the notebook is rarely that door. A company's key handling, a contract's code or your own phone usually is. And because transactions are final, a hack is rarely undone: the notebook keeps the thief's line as faithfully as yours.
Where people get it wrong
- "It's on the blockchain, so it's safe." The record is safe. What the record says can still be a theft.
- "Every blockchain is as hard to attack as Bitcoin." A chain's resistance depends on how much honest work or stake protects it. Small chains have little.
- "Many validators means decentralised." Ronin had nine, and one company ran four of them.
- "Hacks get reversed." Almost never. The Ronin withdrawals stayed in the record like any other payment.
Count the keys
Before you put coins into any bridge, platform or app, ask two questions. How many keys can move the money, and who holds them? If the answer is "a handful, mostly one company", you're trusting that company's locks, not the notebook.
The merchant's ferry had nine keys and needed five. Whoever robbed it never touched the notebook. He only had to find where the keys were kept.
Frequently asked questions
Can a blockchain be hacked?
The record of a large public blockchain is very hard to change, because it would take control of most of the network's mining or staking power. But keys, smart contracts, bridges, exchanges and smaller chains are hacked regularly. "Unhackable" describes none of them.
What was the Ronin bridge hack?
On 23 March 2022 an attacker took control of five of the nine validator keys on Ronin, a blockchain built for a game, and withdrew 173,600 ether and 25.5 million USDC from its bridge. The theft was only noticed on 29 March 2022, when a user couldn't withdraw.
What is a blockchain bridge?
A bridge lets you move tokens from one blockchain to another, usually by locking coins on one chain and issuing matching tokens on the other. The locked coins make a bridge a large target, and its security depends on whoever holds the keys or writes the code.
Is Bitcoin unhackable?
No system is. Bitcoin's record has never been successfully rewritten, but its software has had serious bugs that were fixed, and bitcoin is regularly stolen from exchanges and individuals by stealing keys or tricking people into signing.
Can stolen crypto be returned by reversing the blockchain?
Almost never. Transactions on major blockchains are final once confirmed. Stolen funds can sometimes be traced, frozen at an exchange or seized by authorities, but the original transaction stays in the record.

