"Quantum computers will kill Bitcoin": they threaten some locks, not the notebook
A large enough quantum computer could work out a private key from a public key, and some bitcoin sits behind keys that are already public. No such machine had been shown publicly by November 2026. The fix, new signature schemes, was standardised in August 2024; Bitcoin's version was a draft proposal in November 2026.
Ben has heard a rumour. Somewhere, people are building a machine that can look at any lock and cut the key for it. "When it comes," he tells the village, "I'll open every box in every house."
Anna checks her own box. The lock is still inside the wall. Nobody has ever seen its shape, only a seal over it. Ben's machine needs to see the lock first.
That's the honest answer to the quantum fear. A big enough quantum computer would threaten coins whose public key is already visible on the ledger. It wouldn't rewrite the notebook, and none had been shown publicly by November 2026. The fix exists on paper; by November 2026 Bitcoin hadn't adopted it.
What it is
Every bitcoin is locked to a key pair. The private key is your secret. The public key is what the network uses to check your signature. Ordinary computers can't work back from the public key to the private key in any useful time. That's the whole security of a signature.
A quantum computer is a different kind of machine that could, if built large and reliable enough, solve that particular puzzle. Bitcoin's signatures use elliptic curves, and these are on the list of what such a machine would break. The US standards body NIST says it will deprecate ECDSA, the signature type Bitcoin started with, after 2030 and disallow it in its standards after 2035 (NIST IR 8547, 2026).
Hashes, the seals on every page, are a different matter. NIST's same report says hash functions are "significantly less vulnerable to known quantum attacks" than public-key cryptography. The chain of seals and the mining puzzle are not the weak spot. The locks are.
How it works: which locks are visible
Whether your coins are exposed depends on whether your public key is on the ledger.
- Old-style locks show the key itself. The very first block, on 3 January 2009, paid 50 bitcoin to a lock of type "p2pk": pay to public key. The full 65-byte public key sits in the ledger for anyone to read (mempool.space). Many early coins look like that.
- Most modern addresses show only a hash. The public key stays hidden until you spend. At that moment it appears in your transaction, and the coins are exposed for the minutes before the payment is confirmed.
- Reused addresses stay exposed. Spend once from an address and your public key is public. Any coins left at, or sent again to, that address now sit behind a visible lock.
- Taproot is a special case. BIP 360, a draft proposal to add a quantum-resistant output type, lists "P2PK outputs (e.g. Satoshi's coins, CPU miners)", reused outputs and Taproot outputs starting with bc1p as open to "long exposure attacks" (BIP 360).
Now the size of the machine. On 30 March 2026, researchers from Google Quantum AI, UC Berkeley, the Ethereum Foundation and Stanford, among them Ryan Babbush, Craig Gidney and Dan Boneh, estimated that Bitcoin's curve could be broken with no more than 1,200 logical qubits, run on "fewer than half a million physical qubits", in minutes (Babbush et al., 2026). That is their estimate under their hardware assumptions, and they urged vulnerable cryptocurrencies to move to post-quantum cryptography without delay.
For scale: the chip Google announced on 9 December 2024, Willow, has 105 qubits (Google, 2024). Half a million is about 4,700 times that. The gap is large. The researchers' warning is that it has been shrinking from the estimate side too.
When? Nobody knows, and we won't guess
No one has published a verified date. NIST, announcing its new standards in August 2024, wrote that "some experts predict" a code-breaking device "could appear within a decade" (NIST, 2024). That's a range of opinions, not a forecast.
What is dated is the defence. On 13 August 2024, NIST published three post-quantum standards: FIPS 203 for encryption, and FIPS 204 and FIPS 205 for digital signatures. NIST's lead on the project, Dustin Moody, said: "There is no need to wait for future standards."
Why it matters
- The fix needs everyone to move. New signature types only protect coins that are moved into them. That needs a change to Bitcoin's rules and then millions of people sending their coins to new addresses.
- Lost coins can't move. Coins whose owners have lost their keys, including the early p2pk coins, will sit behind visible locks whatever happens. What to do about them is one of the hardest open questions.
- Bitcoin's plan is a draft. BIP 360 has the status "Draft". A draft is a proposal, not a decision. Who decides is explained in our article on Bitcoin's rules.
Where people get it wrong
- "Quantum computers will rewrite the blockchain." The threat is to signatures. NIST rates hash functions as far less vulnerable.
- "All bitcoin falls at once." Coins behind hidden public keys are much safer than those behind exposed ones, at least until they are spent.
- "Nothing can be done." Post-quantum signature standards were published on 13 August 2024. The work is in adopting them.
- "It's decades away, so ignore it." Nobody knows. Moving every coin takes years, which is why researchers say to start early.
Check your own locks
Look at your wallet. Does it give you a new address for every payment, or have you been receiving to the same one for years? Address reuse is the one quantum risk you control yourself, and it's bad for your privacy anyway. Our article on Bitcoin addresses explains why.
And if a stranger at the gate offers you a "quantum-proof coin" to swap your bitcoin into, only today? Nobody has shown Ben's magic key-cutter. The stranger's sales pitch, everyone has seen.
Frequently asked questions
Can quantum computers break Bitcoin?
A large enough quantum computer could, in principle, work out private keys from public keys on Bitcoin's elliptic curve. No machine anywhere near that size had been shown publicly by November 2026. Bitcoin's hashes and proof of work are much less exposed than its signatures.
Which bitcoin is most at risk from quantum computers?
Coins whose public key is already visible on the ledger: early pay-to-public-key outputs, coins on reused addresses, and Taproot outputs, according to the draft proposal BIP 360. Coins on unused hashed addresses only reveal their public key when spent.
What are NIST's post-quantum standards?
On 13 August 2024, NIST published FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) for encryption, FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) for digital signatures. They are designed to resist attacks by quantum computers. In October 2026 NIST confirmed it will deprecate quantum-vulnerable signatures such as ECDSA after 2030.
How many qubits would it take to break Bitcoin?
A March 2026 paper by researchers from Google Quantum AI, the Ethereum Foundation, UC Berkeley and Stanford estimated no more than 1,200 logical qubits, or fewer than half a million physical qubits under their assumptions. Google's Willow chip, announced in December 2024, has 105 qubits.
What is Bitcoin doing about quantum computers?
There is a draft proposal, BIP 360, for a new output type designed to be usable in a quantum-resistant way. It had not been adopted by November 2026. Any change would need wide agreement and then coin owners moving their funds to new addresses.
Sources
- NIST, NIST releases first 3 finalized post-quantum encryption standards (13 August 2024)
- NIST, IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (final, 27 October 2026)
- Babbush, Gidney, Boneh, Drake and others, Securing Elliptic Curve Cryptocurrencies against Quantum Vulnerabilities (IACR ePrint 2026/625, 30 March 2026)
- Google, Hartmut Neven, Meet Willow, our state-of-the-art quantum chip (9 December 2024)
- BIP 360, Pay-to-Merkle-Root (P2MR), status Draft, created 18 December 2024
- mempool.space API, Bitcoin genesis block transaction (3 January 2009)

